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THE IMMINENT DEMISE OF INTERSPOUSAL 
TORT IMMUNITY 
Carl Tobias* 
During the decade of the 1980s, I extensively explored the 
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity in the United States.1 I 
examined the origins and development of the concept; how the 
notion survived intact in every jurisdiction throughout the 
nation until 1914; the first successful efforts to abolish 
immunity during the teens; the slow pace of abrogation in the 
five decades between 1920 and 1970; and the steady decline of 
the doctrine thereafter. 
Indeed, only a small number of states in the country still 
retain any form of interspousal tort immunity, even though 
some jurisdictions evince concern about certain issues involving 
the doctrine. Illustrative are questions implicating the validity 
of family exclusion clauses in insurance policies whose 
application can have the effect of retaining immunity and the 
issue of whether a divorced spouse can maintain a personal 
injury suit in intentional tort separate from a marital 
dissolution action. 2 
I also analyzed all of the major public policy arguments 
articulated in favor of immunity's retention and the important 
policy contentions enunciated for its abolition. I concluded that 
none of the ideas espoused for retaining immunity - such as 
preservation of marital harmony as well as prevention of fraud 
and collusion and the pursuit of frivolous litigation - had much 
validity and recommended that the doctrine be completely 
abrogated. However, I acknowledged that abolition would not 
•Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I 
wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte 
Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trnst for generous, continuing 
support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Carl Tobias, lnterspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359 
(1989). 
2. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1982); Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 
1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (Ohio 1987). 
See generally LEONARD KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND 
SEXUAL ABUSE (1994). 
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substantially improve conditions for women in the United 
States. 
In the course of that research, I searched for patterns 
relating to the immunity doctrine. The material in the first 
paragraph of this essay illustrates temporal dimensions which 
were relevant to interspousal immunity's retention and 
abrogation. More specifically, the rise of the women's movement 
and its culmination in winning the suffrage during the teens 
may explain the early group of decisions which overruled the 
doctrine. The relative quiescence of the women's movement over 
the succeeding four decades seems to explain the slow pace of 
abolition in that period, while the revitalization of the 
movement during the mid-1960s appears to explain the 
doctrine's rapid decline from 1970 until the present. These 
explanations have some surface plausibility, although they may 
be too "structuralist." Numerous other factors, such as 
developments in the relevant areas of substantive tort law 
involving, for instance, its compensatory purpose, are at least as 
persuasive. 
I searched for additional patterns in my research on 
interspousal tort immunity. Another avenue was the notion of 
geographic patterns. I was cognizant of the legendary William 
Prosser's suggestion that courts in the South and West tended to 
be more conservative, particularly in matters involving personal 
honor and chivalry.3 My preliminary efforts to detect 
geographical patterns, however, failed to yield much material 
that I considered particularly meaningful. 4 
I want to revisit that possibility and to explore other ideas 
in · this essay primarily by tracing the rise and demise of 
interspousal tort immunity in the jurisdictions of Montana and 
Virginia. I have selected Montana and Virginia for several 
reasons. Each may serve as a surrogate for its respective region, 
even if neither is necessarily a perfect representative. Tracing 
the doctrine in the two states might reveal patterns or at least 
afford helpful insights that could be applied to seek immunity's 
abolition in the few jurisdictions that cling to this antiquated 
concept. I am also familiar with the jurisprudence of each state, 
and I feel relatively comfortable with the local legal cultures and 
broader cultures of the two jurisdictions. I am a member of the 
3. See JOHN w. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 104-05 (9th ed. 1994); see also Fox Butterfield, Why America's 
Murder Rate is So High, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, § 4 at 1. 
4. See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 409-22. 
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bars in Montana and Virginia, while I lived much of my adult 
life in Montana and most of my earlier years in Virginia. 
I. MONTANA 
Although states began recognizing interspousal tort 
immunity as early as 1863, Montana did not adopt the doctrine 
until 1932. 5 The Montana Supreme Court relied substantially 
on the notion that a woman's legal identity merged into her 
husband's upon marriage, the common law rule against 
interspousal tort suits which could only be changed by a Married 
Women's Act, and the determination that the Montana 
legislation was not meant to modify the doctrine.6 
Subsequent opinions issued the following year and in 1968 
simply cited the earlier precedent and depended on legislative 
inaction respecting tort immunity.7 In 1975, the Montana 
Supreme Court reiterated that the Married Women's measure 
failed to authorize interspousal tort claims and proclaimed that 
the doctrine's abolition was a public policy issue that should be 
left to the legislature, which is the appropriate entity to 
ascertain and prescribe public policy. 8 It is interesting to note 
that women whose husbands' negligent driving injured them 
brought each of these four cases.9 
Before 1979, no woman had ever pursued an intentional tort 
suit against her husband in Montana that resulted in the 
issuance of a reported judicial opinion. The 1979 session of the 
Montana Legislature abrogated the immunity for intentional 
torts in the context of enacting legislation, the primary purpose 
of which was to rectify or ameliorate the problem of spousal 
abuse. 10 
In 1986, the Montana Supreme Court abolished 
5. See Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932). In this section of the 
essay, I rely on Carl Tobias, lnterspousal Tort Immunity in Montana, 47 MONT. L. REV. 
23, 27-29 (1986). 
6. See Conley, 92 Mont. at 438-40, 15 P.2d at 925-26. The court relied somewhat 
on the notion that permitting litigation would disrupt marital harmony and on the idea 
that the court should defer to the legislature on this issue. See id. at 440, 15 P.2d at 926. 
7. See Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933); State ex rel. Angvall v. 
District Court, 151 Mont. 483, 484-86, 444 P.2d 370, 370-71 (1968). The two decisions 
treat legislative inaction as important to, if not dispositive of, the immunity issue. 
8. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 485-86, 544 
P.2d 444, 446-47 (1975). 
9. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 27 n.24. 
10. See MONT. CODE ANN.§ 40-2-109 (1997); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at·2s & 
n.31. 
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interspousal tort immunity in negligence actions.11 The court 
found the concept of unity between husband and wife to be 
outmoded and that statutory and case law had significantly 
eroded the notion.12 The Montana Supreme Court also stated 
that the filing of civil litigation would not destroy family 
harmony in a sound family and remarked that this was 
particularly true when redress was sought against the spouses' 
insurance company.13 The court correspondingly rejected the 
argument that husbands and wives would engage in fraud and 
collusion, suggesting that judges and juries can ascertain 
whether spouses are participating in that type of behavior.14 
II. VIRGINIA 
In a 1918 case, a woman intentionally injured by her 
husband asked the Virginia Supreme Court to find that the 1877 
Married Women's Act permitted tort litigation between 
spouses.15 The court rejected her request, finding that the 
legislation did not afford married women a new cause of action 
but only expanded remedies which those women already 
possessed at common law.16 
During 1952, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to permit 
a tort suit by a woman to recover for personal injuries which her 
spouse inflicted on her before their marriage.17 The court 
determined that the common law rule precluded liability for 
prenuptial personal injuries.18 Three years later, however, the 
Supreme Court did allow a husband to recover from his wife for 
a property tort.19 
The Virginia Supreme Court began partially abrogating 
interspousal tort immunity for negligent torts in 1971. The 
court permitted the administrator of a deceased woman's estate 
to pursue a wrongful death action against the husband, who had 
11. See Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986). 
12. See id. at 218-19, 721 P.2d at 345. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'r, 96 S.E. 315 (Va. 1918). In this section of 
the essay, I rely on Lisa Anderson-Lloyd, Comment, The Legislative Abrogation of 
Interspousal Immunity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1981). 
16. See Keister, 96 S.E. at 317. 
17. See Furey v. Furey, 71 S.E. 2d 191 (Va. 1952). 
18. See id. at 192. 
19. See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 89 S.E.2d 69 (Va. 1955). 
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killed her in an automobile accident. 20 The court characterized 
the common law notion of unity as an "outmoded concept" which 
would not prevent suit.21 It also rejected the major public policy 
reasons that judges had announced in support of the immunity 
doctrine. The Virginia Supreme Court found that the existence 
of insurance minimized any threat to family harmony and that 
the potential for fraud and collusion between husbands and 
wives was insufficient to preclude recovery for personal 
injuries.22 
In a 1975 case, the court adopted another exception to tort 
immunity by allowing the administrator of an estate to pursue a 
wrongful death action for the deceased's parents and brothers 
against the husband's committee.23 The court did recognize the 
public policy of promoting connubial tranquility but determined 
that it was inapplicable when one spouse's intentional act ended 
the marriage and the "deceased spouse is survived by no living 
child or grandchild."24 
In a notorious 1980 case, however, the Virginia Supreme 
Court refused to abrogate interspousal immunity for an 
intentionally inflicted tort.25 A woman hired a third party to 
murder her husband. While the third party failed to kill the 
husband, the third party succeeded in severely injuring the 
husband.26 The husband divorced his wife and filed a tort suit 
soon thereafter. 
The court asserted that permitting damage actions in this 
context "would contribute to the disruption of many marriages" 
because of the incentive to sue for personal injuries27 and 
refused to add another "abrasive and unnecessary ingredient" to 
the connubial relationship.28 The Virginia Supreme Court also 
resuscitated earlier policy arguments, observing that redress in 
criminal or divorce courts afforded adequate relief and evincing 
concern about a flood of frivolous or trivial litigation over petty 
conjugal grievances.29 
20. See Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971). 
21. Id. at 202. 
22. See id. 
23. See Korman v. Carpenter, 216 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1975). 
24. See id. at 198. 
25. See Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1980). 
26. See id. at 895-96. 
27. Id. at 897-98. 
28. Id. at 898. 
29. See id. at 898 n.4. 
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The next year, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
legislation abrogating interspousal tort immunity. The statute 
provided that the "common law defense of interspousal 
immunity in tort is abolished and shall not constitute a valid 
defense to any such cause of action arising on or after July 1, 
1981."30 
III. MONTANA AND VIRGINIA 
These stories of the rise and fall of interspousal tort 
immunity in Montana and Virginia exhibit some common 
themes. Both states recognized the doctrine relatively late in its 
existence and for rather similar public policy reasons. The two 
jurisdictions fully abrogated negligence immunity within the 
same· decade, while the state legislatures essentially abolished 
intentional tort immunity. 
Yet there were important differences. At the same time 
that the Montana Legislature eliminated intentional tort 
immunity to protect wives from spousal abuse, the Virginia 
Supreme Court decided to retain this immunity for antiquated 
reasons implicating the preservation of marital harmony only to 
have the state legislature fully abrogate the doctrine the 
following year. 
The legislatures of the two jurisdictions, although reaching 
the same conclusion, apparently passed these statutes for 
dissimilar reasons. Montana treated immunity's abolition as a 
women'~ rights issue, enacting the measure as a component of a 
package aimed at spousal abuse, while Virginia principally 
reacted to an archaic judicial decision. The state supreme courts 
partially eliminated immunity in specific contexts, but the state 
legislatures in each jurisdiction shared substantial 
responsibility for the doctrine's complete abolition. 
The timing and manner of interspousal tort immunity's 
abrogation in Montana and Virginia illuminate minimally 
Professor Prosser's suggestion that courts in the South and the 
West tend to be conservative, especially as to issues of chivalry 
and personal honor.31 First, it is unclear what conservative 
means in the immunity context. For example, both the Montana 
stereotype of independent, self-reliant frontier women and the 
Virginia stereotype of southern belles could have been 
instrumental in eliminating the doctrine much earlier than was 
30. VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-220.1(Michie1997). 
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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done out of respect for women or to protect them. Second, the 
concepts of chivalry and personal honor do not explain why each 
jurisdiction waited so long to permit intentional tort suits 
against wife batterers who had treated their spouses in the least 
chivalrous and honorable manner imaginable. Of course, some 
issues related to the timing of the doctrine's demise are random 
and merely reflect when plaintiffs were willing to bring, and 
attorneys were willing to file, cases. 
The growing recognition of women's rights and the revival of 
the women's movement may partially explain the complete 
abolition of the doctrine in the two states during the 1980s. 
Developments in substantive tort law, and perhaps in family 
law-because interspousal immunity was apparently more a 
family, than a tort, law doctrine32-probably afford better 
explanations. After all, liability was rapidly expanding across a 
broad front of substantive tort law doctrines during the relevant 
period. Examples include: the closely related parent-child 
immunity; other immunities pertaining to the government and 
to charities; the evolution of products liability from negligence to 
warranty to strict liability; and the merger of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk as complete defenses into 
comparative negligence. 33 
In short, Montana and Virginia abolished interspousal tort 
immunity in certain similar, and some different, ways. Neither 
jurisdiction may serve particularly well as a surrogate for its 
region. For instance, numerous states in the Rocky Mountains 
and the Northern Plains abrogated the immunity earlier in time 
and more comprehensively than Montana. 34 Illustrative are 
Colorado35 and North Dakota36 which completely eliminated the 
doctrine in the 1930s and Idaho37 and South Dakota38 that did so 
in the 1940s. Moreover, North Carolina and South Carolina, 
Virginia's rather close neighbors, and Alabama in the deep 
South were among the seven states whose supreme courts 
abolished interspousal tort immunity in the teens,39 even as the 
32. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 394-98. 
33. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 437-38. 
34. These states abolished interspousal tort immunity for intentional and 
negligent torts while Montana's abolition was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion. 
35. See Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1935). 
36. See Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932). 
37. See Lorang v. Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1949). 
38. See Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941). 
39. See Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335, 338 (Ala. 1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 
S.E. 206, 210 (N.C. 1920); Prosser v. Prosser, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (S.C. 1920); see also 
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evolution of the doctrine's abrogation in the contiguous, border 
states of Maryland and West Virginia resembles developments 
in Virginia,40 while the southern states of Florida and Georgia 
have been among the last to eliminate immunity.41 
Finally, the somewhat tortured paths to abolition that 
unfolded in the two states may afford insights for individuals 
and organizations, such as married women harmed by their 
husbands and women's rights groups in those jurisdictions that 
have not yet totally abolished interspousal tort immunity. 
Perhaps most important, the developments in Montana and 
Virginia suggest that the most effective route to comprehensive 
reform is through legislation. Proponents of abrogation should 
tout these bills as facilitating the vindication of women's rights 
or as the appropriate elimination of a doctrine that has outlived 
any validity that it may have had. In states where abolition's 
advocates cannot persuade legislatures to jettison the immunity, 
proponents should pursue tort litigation seeking abrogation and 
rely on criticisms of the major policy arguments respecting 
marital harmony, fraud and collusion and frivolous and trivial 
suits articulated in Montana and Virginia as well as numerous 
other jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
This survey of one substantive tort law doctrine that is 
significant to women illustrates several ideas. It indicates that 
developments in that substantive field may have been more 
important to abolition than the women's movement or women's 
rights arguments. The review shows that a number of 
similarities and some differences attended abrogation in the two 
jurisdictions, which are rather representative of their regions. It 
demonstrates the difficulty of finding very precise temporal or 
geographical patterns. The treatment affords as well proposals 
for reform in state legislatures and courts and suggests 
strategies for fully abolishing the doctrine. 
Tobias, supra note 1, at 409-22. 
40. See Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 (Md. 1978); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 
S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); see also supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §741.235 (West 1997); Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 
1360 (Fla. 1993); Shoemake v. Shoemake, 407 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. 1991). 
